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19 Between idealisation and stigmatisation
Analytical dimensions of the media image 
Ellen Hijmans and Fred Wester*
Most content analysis studies of media images, sometimes labeled as representa­
tions or portrayals, take the images to be reconstructed as of a merely empirical 
nature. A conceptual vision on the Media Image as such is problematic because 
what counts as the content of media messages is open, and does not allow a 
simple reconstruction of empirical patterns. In this chapter we initiate a frame­
work for media imagery research by discussing the central notion of Media Im­
age as a concept related to the identity family. First we present Hijmans’ 
Dynamic Identity Model that elaborates the analytical dimensions of the con­
cepts of personal and social identity. Next we discuss examples of empirically re­
constructed media images from a study of the portrayal of the Dutch and the 
Germans in news reports. Finally we formulate analytical dimensions relevant 
for content analysis studies on media images.
19.1 Introduction
The impact of media has many faces. One of these is the contribution of media to pro­
cesses of public imagery e.g. mediated images of groups or social categories. Research 
into media images is generally under-theorised. In most studies, the media images (also 
labeled media representations or portrayals) to be reconstructed are taken to be of a 
merely and solely empirical nature. As a consequence, the two major research traditions 
in this field are concerned with either counting characteristics derived from predefined 
stereotypes (for instance Lubbers, Scheepers & Wester, 1998), or with the interpretative 
reconstruction of patterns of meaning in a text (for instance Wester, Pleijter & Renck- 
storf, 2004). Both approaches lack a perspective on the basic theoretical characteristics 
of the concept Media Image that allows for a definition of such patterns in terms of an 
image.
The absence of a conceptual vision on the Media Image is problematic because of 
what counts as the content of media messages is, in itself, problematic and dependent on 
a variety of contexts related to the message (Wester, 2004; Krippendorff, 2004). In gen­
eral terms, media content is produced in a particular institutional context (for instance a 
newsroom) and refers to a broad social-cultural context (for instance the Netherlands in 
1997). However, during analysis the media text is read from a different context, the re­
search question, for instance the imagery pertaining to the Germans and Dutch (see
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Wester, Pleijter & Renckstorf, 2004). In other readings, other contexts are used. As a 
consequence, media messages are considered to be of a principally open nature, which 
does not allow a simple reconstruction of empirical patterns, because part of the empir­
ical content is latent in the text. Thus media content has to be specified beforehand by 
elaborating the framework and logic of a content analytic study (Krippendorff, 1980). 
Part of the framework for media imagery research is the elaboration of the Media Image 
as an analytical concept in terms of the context of the study that allows the researcher to 
validate empirical reconstructions to be assessed in the study.
In this chapter it is our aim to initiate such a framework for media imagery research 
by considering the central notion of the Media Image (media representation, or media 
portrayal) as a concept that belongs to the Identity family. In recent decades there have 
been numerous descriptions and definitions of the concept of Identity. The simplest of 
these is still that of Zijderveld. He described identity as everything that answers the 
questions “Who am I?” “Who are we?”, and “Who are they?” (1987, p. 112).
In this vein Media Images can be considered as attributed identities that, we con­
tend, have the same basic structure as described in the Dynamic Identity Model for per­
sonal and social identity (Hijmans, 2003). In what follows we will consider the 
consequences of this contention for the concept of Media Image. First we will present 
the Dynamic Identity Model and its basic structure, then we will discuss examples of 
media images from a research project on the portrayal of the Dutch and Germans in 
news reports of German and Dutch regional newspapers. Next, we will discuss the con­
sequences of the Dynamic Identity Model for the media image concept. Finally we will 
formulate our conclusions in terms of the analytical dimensions to be used in content 
analytic studies of media images.
19.2 The Dynamic Identity Model
The historian Frijhoff stated that identity stands at the cross-roads of the psychological 
and the social (1993, p. 17). Identity is the link between the personal or psychological 
and the social or cultural. The Dynamic Identity Model is a synthesis of approaches to 
identity that offers the opportunity to examine these cross-roads. That can be done in 
two ways: firstly two levels of identity are distinguished— an individual-personal level 
at which the experiences and definitions of the individual have a place, and a collective- 
social level at which identity is expressed in group definitions and group behaviour. 
Both levels can be examined separately and in relation to each other. In the latter case it 
concerns both the social nature of personal identity and the psychological aspects of so­
cial identity. The link between the psychological and the social, for example, could offer 
an explanation for the affective power of such abstractions as national or ethnic identity. 
Precisely these links and their embedding in the interaction processes can explain the 
complexity of such phenomena.
Secondly, the link between the psychological and the social is apparent as two poles 
in the process of identity construction. One is apparent as an inward-looking, reflexive 
process and the other as a more outward-looking, interactive process because identity 
results from interactions with others. In the model the two approaches are complement­
ary—the historical-continuous approach that emphasises structure as the preservation of 
unity and sameness, and the relational-interactional approach that emphasises process 
and the notion of difference. The central idea that expresses the complexity of identity is









affective - biography tradition
historical
Difference
relational - Uniqueness Distinction
interactional character, authenticity inclusion /  exclusion
Figure 19.1 Dynamic Identity Model: Basic dimension and levels (Hijmans, 2003, 
p. 118)
the co-presence of continuity (or similarity) and differentiation from others (Perinbanay- 
agam, 2000, p. 87). At both levels of identity the same processes are at work, as De 
Swaan says: social identification has much in common with the psychogenetic process 
that is called ‘identification’ in psychoanalysis (1994, p. 7).
To summarise, the three points of departure of the identity model agree with the 
symbolic interactionist standpoint that everyone has multiple, situation-dependent iden­
tities. One can define oneself as an individual person and as a member of several associ­
ations. A second point of departure is that identity is a symbolic structure, based on the 
human capacity for reflection, language and culture, in which the construction of mean­
ing in interaction with others is of central importance. The personal self is therefore al­
ways a socially and morally responsible self (Lock, 1981; Greenwood, 1994). A final 
point of departure deals with the dynamic process of identity construction. Identity is 
the product and expression of relationships with others in which the psychological and 
the social are interwoven. The dynamic concerns the non-static character of identity, the 
situational flexibility, and the mutual involvement of the levels of identity in the game 
of comparison, of sameness and difference. The general idea is that individuals, as 
members of several groups, must unite the different emotional appeals of these groups 
in a ‘story of one’s own’, in a narrative of self (c.f. Giddens, 1991).
The model as presented in Figure 19.1 has a primarily heuristic value, and offers a 
view of the tension between personal and social identity or, more conceptually, the dia­
lectic relationship between individual and society. The model shows that individuals 
sometimes speak as a person, and at other times speak as a member of a group, and be­
sides it describes the kind of tension that might be expressed. This is essentially differ­
ent from explaining group behaviour by purely psychological needs, such as the social 
identity theory of Tajfel (1981), or the desire to differentiate oneself as in Bourdieu’s 
distinction theory (1979).
In this schematic presentation, we see first of all that in both levels of identity pro­
cesses of sameness and difference are at play, by which we can understand identity con­
struction at various levels. On a personal level the processes are typified as ‘continuity’ 
and ‘uniqueness’, and on the social level as ‘conformity’ and ‘distinction’. Given in ital­
ics are the concretisations of these processes as manifestations of identity, such as bio­
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graphy and tradition. The dynamic of the continuous change cannot be made visible in 
the model, but the grey lines indicate the possibilities of exchange between levels and 
dimensions, whereby it must be emphasised that we are dealing with continuums and 
not discrete units. Before elaborating on the cells, the central approaches of the figure 
will be explicated as the nucleus of identity construction.
19.2.1 The basic dimension of identity: sameness and difference
Together, sameness and difference form the nucleus of the process of identity construc­
tion. They demonstrate the fact that identity is an expression of connection and relation­
ships with others. As symbolic interactionists state, there is no self without others: 
“Selves can only exist in definite relationships to other selves” (Mead, 1934, p. 164). 
There are two sides to the coin of connection. On the one hand, emotional involvement 
with others is a necessary condition for safety and security. By being part of diverse 
groups and by belonging based on commonality and (elective) affinity, individuals feel 
at home. From the perspective of identity, group membership offers a social identity, 
grounded in a sense of belonging, similar ways of thinking and acting. Group members 
must respect certain limits but also willingly adhere to such limits motivated by emo­
tional commitment (conformity).
On the other hand, involvement in a group also means positioning and setting limits 
in respect of other groups. The presence of other individuals and groups activates the 
process that one, as an individual or as a group, is thrown back on oneself as being ‘not- 
the-same’. Contrast brings about distance in a relationship. Identity situates individuals 
and groups in the world and in relation to each other. Situating and being situated on the 
basis of common group characteristics, or categorisations, means drawing symbolic 
boundaries based on differences. These are characteristics that distinguish one’s own 
group in thought and action from other groups (distinction), and the unique characterist­
ics that define an individual and situate one in a group as ‘different’ (uniqueness). Being 
unique, or individual, is by definition the expression of a relationship. It is necessary to 
have one or more others with whom one can compare oneself and in respect of whom 
one can call oneself ‘different’. This kind of relationships stimulates the self-conscious­
ness of individuals and groups as ‘different’. In this way difference is not only a rela­
tional but also, and primarily, a process of interaction that is ‘outwardly’ directed 
towards comparison and contrast with others. Because others and situations are con­
stantly changing, there are multiple aspects of identity, changeable and varying with the 
situation.
One sees oneself not only in relation to the world and to others, but also to one’s self 
image. Just as connections within a group are necessary to hold the group together, so 
has the individual to be connected with the self and personal life experiences, with what 
belongs to the self, transcending the everyday changes of situation. Comparisons then 
are made not with others, but with oneself over time. Identity is partially the result of 
past experiences. As Erikson (1959, p. 23) defined, the idea of continuity is primarily a 
feeling or experience of being the same in time. As an internal process, involvement is 
primarily an affective experience, a feeling, and at the individual level denotes what 
conformity and ‘common group characteristic’ is for the social level, namely the affect­
ive-historical aspect of identity construction. A group has a history that transcends indi­
vidual members of the group, and analogous to that the individual course of life
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(biography) transcends particular situations in which the individual takes part as well as 
the various partial-identities that go with these.
With history, memory plays an important role in identity construction. This concerns 
the fact that temporality is one of the basic co-ordinates of human experience and exist­
ence. A person exists in time, both existentially and culturally, through which identity 
and meaning are connected to the subjective experience of time (Rappaport, Enrich & 
Wilson, 1992). This means that every construction of identity is orientated on time, 
from both a specific cultural-historical background and a view of one’s own history. 
Who one is, is determined, among other things, by past actions for which one is morally 
responsible and for which one wants the recognition of others (for example, restitution 
for past injustice), but also those that, unasked, are attributed to someone (stereotyping, 
labeling). At a personal level, someone without a past and without a life history, such as 
a foundling or someone suffering from loss of memory, has no real or complete identity, 
and, in the last case, no future. A group or organisation (e.g., a broadcasting company), 
that considers the demands of the present day, would like to know at least what is the 
core that must be retained, considering the continuation of the organisation.
The historical-affective aspect of identity construction includes a comparison over 
time, with earlier stages of life and earlier experiences. From these comparisons flows 
the unity and sameness with which one is connected. We shall see that this implies a se­
lective ordering of past incidents. Its primary function is foundation of the present and 
projection of the future in terms of what is experienced as the heart of a person or 
group. Belonging to a group, therefore, always has both an affective and a historical as­
pect. ‘Sameness’ or ‘unity’ means an internal, ‘inward’ directed reflexive process in 
which the individual or group reaches its own conscious story. In this place in the mod­
el, self-consciousness is considered less as thought than as a momentary feeling of be­
ing ‘other’ in relation to continuously changing others, but the ‘same’ in relation to 
oneself, with a self-constructed and continuously revised ‘narrative of self’ (Giddens, 
1991, p. 53). In particular on the level of personal identity, a somewhat essentialist ex­
planation is still given, but as Strauss (1969, p. 114) emphasised, unity, in the terms of 
Erikson, is a constructed ego-synthesis, an ‘imagined persistence’, and just as much is 
‘difference’ the product of subjective meaning attribution.
19.2.2 Levels of identity: personal and social identity
So far it has become clear that personal identity results from the processes ‘continuity’ 
and ‘uniqueness’ and for now the reader must accept that these processes, in concrete 
form, are grounded in the biography and character or authenticity of the individual. The 
personal identity is a unique constellation of multiple partial identities and because the 
biography of every individual contains a fitting reconstruction of his or her life, every 
personal identity is by definition unique.
The same is applicable to a collective group identity. Each group has its own history 
and distinguishes itself by its own traditions, and on those grounds outsiders are separ­
ated from insiders. As De Swaan (1994, p. 6) states: the common denominator also 
works as a divider. The collective history is internalised and emotionally conducted by 
group involvement into the personal history.
At the level of social identity the emphasis lies on the working of difference. Con­
cepts such as status, role and lifestyle denote differences in behaviour and values of
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public identities. Viewed as interaction, difference results in difference in treatment; 
stigma is a well-known example of this. More politically orientated researchers, such as 
those with a background in cultural studies, concentrate mainly on the cultural workings 
of difference in a context of power (Woodward, 1997; Hall & DuGay, 1996), and the 
consequences of ‘politics of difference’ for daily life, particularly for minorities. The 
working of difference is also clearly a focus in cultural anthropological research (Ten- 
nekes, 1992), or research into the lifestyle of (sub)cultures. As Hebdige (1979, p. 102) 
states: difference is the most important message people want to get across, it is the nuc­
lear concept to which all other concepts are subordinate.
Personal and social identities are connected in many ways, either co-operative or 
confrontational (Fontana, 1984). In research which does not use our view of connection 
they are treated as two separate entities. Personal identity is associated with psycholo­
gical aspects, such as personality, self-image, the true or false self, and the emotions and 
opinions one has of oneself. In the Dynamic Identity Model psychological aspects 
emerge as the affective element of the connection to others, either positive or negative, 
and in the attachment to one’s own life story, ideas, and habits. Involvement and dis­
tance essentially are emotions that become covered with rationalisations and legitima­
tions for actions, including the judgment and treatment of ‘others’, with which the 
transition to the social level of identity becomes a fact.
Summarising, on the personal and social levels of identity both psychological (in­
ternal) and social (external) forces are at work. On both levels feelings of attachment 
and distance play a role, and at both levels one is susceptible to the influence of others. 
This is apparent in the importance of relations and interactions through which the in­
ternal reflexivity of individuals and groups is stimulated, together with the conscious­
ness of being both ‘other’ and ‘the same’. It is clear that identity cannot exist without 
others, but neither can it exist without individual reflexivity.
This sketch of the dialectical relationship between the personal and the social is not 
complete without highlighting how individuality finds its way in the social. This is ap­
parent in cultural renewal and change. These refer not in the first place to the artistic, 
where creative innovation is a sign of quality, but to ordinary everyday life in which in­
dividuals, within certain limits, hold their own interpretation of what is socially expec­
ted. In terms of the Dynamic Identity Model these processes are shown by the dynamic 
balance between the cells ‘uniqueness’ and ‘conformity’. Socialisation in common 
group characteristics, as we shall see, is not total, and the individual is never completely 
determined by the group. Because each individual is unique the performance of expec­
ted behaviour will vary to some extent, and some performances will be followed by oth­
ers. Furthermore, circumstances tend to change and individuals are sometimes forced to 
adapt creatively, but usually changes occur slowly and almost unnoticed, and are en­
titled as ‘the spirit of the times’, a term that indicates that history cannot be regarded as 
static.
Because groups tend to preservation, the space for individuality is limited. In west­
ern culture individuality is clearly valued but must be balanced against the claims of 
significant groups. The ‘flexible I ’ (Klaassen, 1993) denotes the position of the modern 
individual who in daily life regularly experiences a tension between the cells ‘unique­
ness’ and ‘conformity’ of the Dynamic Identity Model. This tension is the reverse side 
of the affective bond with others, but for the continuity of a dynamic society this tension
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is essential. Therefore we can also speak of a dialectical relationship between personal 
and social identity: neither can exist without the other.
In the next sections we will specify sameness and difference at both the personal and 
social level.
19.2.3 Sameness at a personal level: continuity -  biography
At a personal level the internal process of self-experience is a form of understanding 
one’s self and primarily an ordering activity. Since life unfolds in time, the ordering (and 
with it the understanding) of events is framed within the sphere of memory. Starting 
from there one orientates oneself in the present and anticipates the future. To paraphrase 
Mead (1932), we can state that in the orientation on the present both the past and future 
are co-present. Not all past events are important for the present and the future; they are 
‘selectively relevant’ and that is also the case for self-understanding. Identity is rooted 
in the past and is directed at the future from a continuous re-interpretation in the 
present. In this sense, identity is a process and always in the state of becoming (Rappa- 
port, et al. 1982, p. 68). The idea of identity as a symbolic construction, which is rarely 
further explicated in the literature, also means being connected with this intertwining of 
earlier and present experiences that must continually be forged into a meaningful whole. 
In other words, identity at a personal level is indeed a synthesis in order to make sense 
of a continual stream of life experiences. What could be seen as a need for continuity 
and integration can now be explained as a necessary condition to understand one’s self 
and one’s life. An important anchor in this is the comprehensive cognitive structure that 
brings events and partial-identities, the varying roles and status of the individual to a co­
herent synthesis (Epstein, 1978; Ewing, 1990; Baumeister, 1995).
This symbolic ordering of life events materialises in the ‘biography’, the story of 
their life that individuals tell themselves and others. The biography is a manifestation of 
identity at a personal level. In the life story the aim of life appears to be unity and con­
tinuity, and this is also experienced as such, but in fact it is necessarily a selective order­
ing, because not all events are relevant in every context. The unity of a life story chiefly 
lies in ‘the eye of the beholder’ (Strauss, 1969, p. 147).
Some authors emphasise less the cognitive and more the emotional aspects of iden­
tity such as ‘self-feeling’, a concept derived from Cooley (Erickson, 1995, p. 125), or an 
intuitive comprehensive feeling of the whole idea of ‘being in the world’ (Douglas, 
1984, p. 96). The latter author attempts to get a conceptual grip on the complexity of 
self-experience that is both personally and socially determined, and is directed at both 
the past and future. Self-conscious individuals know where they are, where they were at 
an earlier moment in time, and where they will be at some moment in the future. Be­
cause they also still know what they did and that they did it themselves, they are 
through this awareness of continuity morally responsible for their actions (Lock, 1981, 
p. 32). This is one of the ways in which personal identity is linked to the moral order of 
society.
19.2.4 Sameness at the social level: conformity -  tradition
At the group level sameness results from the process of ‘conformity’. Social identity, 
‘who we are’, is based on an emotional group solidarity that binds the members of the
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group to each other and to the past, among other things by myths (of origin). This form 
of collective memory is, just like personal identity, necessarily selective and the result 
of meaning attribution. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) employ the concept ‘invention of 
tradition’ that is used mainly in the context of nations and local societies. The thought 
behind it is nevertheless clear and is just as applicable to a primary group such as a fam­
ily. Traditions, in the form of customs, habits, laws, institutions and so forth, are ob­
jectivations of what has crystallised in the passage of time in a society, and what is 
handed down to the following generations as cultural inheritance. Tradition symbolises 
the temporal aspect of continuity and the link with the past; it is passed on in the form 
of stories that explain the past, present and future, the heart of what holds a group to­
gether and what it stands for. Besides the way in which the group understands the world, 
tradition is also externalised in actions and routines or life-styles that distinguish one 
group from other groups.
The term ‘conformity’ suggests social control, and to a certain extent that will be the 
case, for example in the form of specialists who explain and guard the group identity 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 70), but conformity does not mean determination. Not 
only is the bond affective, by which coercion is not experienced as such, but accordance 
with essential points is a necessary condition for the continuation of a group. In Mead’s 
terms, conformity serves the aims of co-operation and adaptive behaviour. Moreover, 
complete socialisation, in the anthropological sense, is impossible (Berger & Luck­
mann, 1967, p. 163). One cannot know and experience all of reality, if it is only that in­
dividuals are also concerned with their bodily impulses and the inner self-experience. 
Moreover, one is a member of several groups and takes part in several realities that at 
various points can be contradictory.
Social identity has many forms— from primary groups to abstract groups such as na­
tions in which there is a bond between people who do not know each other personally 
on the basis of a common characteristic ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). 
‘Fellow feeling’, taken from Geertz (Triandafyllidou, 1998, p. 595), or what is often 
called the ‘irrational’ bond with such an imagined community and its traditions, is re­
garded as being at the heart of collective identity. The irrationality is better understood 
when one realises that the bond with significant others from primary groups one shares 
membership with, ensures that that the common social identity is internalised and thus 
becomes part of the personal identity. In this way an act of aggression against a nation 
may be felt as an act against a person, and the victory of a football team may be experi­
enced as a personal triumph.
As explained above, difference and sameness are strongly related on the social level. 
As a consequence, in the next paragraph we continue to discuss the social level to elab­
orate on difference, before we switch again to the personal level.
19.2.5 Difference at the social level: distinction -  inclusion / exclusion
Collective identity, such as national identity, expresses itself in specific meanings and 
actions (Schlesinger, 1987, p. 259-261). By being recognisable, it is always presented in 
more or less the same way (tradition), so that the particularity of the group is manifest to 
both members of the group and to others. Because identity is relational, the presence of 
others stimulates the solidarity of the group on the one hand, and on the other, the dis­
tinction or difference from outsiders. The judgment that takes place when meeting actu­
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al others can be typified as a process of inclusion and exclusion. Tennekes (1992, p. 
191-192) says that judgment of others is connected to being human. Life is judging 
things and people and that is easiest on the grounds of one’s own values. He mentions 
also a specific explanation for distinction, namely the human need to distinguish oneself 
with the help of the cultural differences available; Bourdieu (1979) expresses the same 
idea in another form. He calls the ‘logic of difference’ (1979, p. 153) one of the organ­
ising principles of our society. Difference is a form of symbolic capital with which one 
can take a position in respect of others.
A second explanation for the primacy of difference emphasises competition (c.f. De 
Swaan, 1994). In a certain way the process of division can be called ‘logical’. The group 
with which one is involved demands loyalty and in a situation of competition one can­
not be loyal to two groups at the same time. Competition is a broad concept: it concerns 
both acquiring scarce goods (to survive mentally or physically) and acquiring recogni­
tion from others. Depending on the power relationships in a society, this could mean 
that certain collective identities are excluded from social possibilities in favour of more 
powerful groups. To be disqualified in this way suggests that identity may be imposed, 
but may nevertheless become part of the collective self-definition. This means that iden­
tity, such as national identity, is not so much an autonomous concept, but rather the 
product of a dual relationship— one group is included and the other group is excluded 
(Triandafyllidou, 1998). The favourable results of the presence of (‘significant’) others 
for the formulation of collective identity means that it is assumed that others form a 
threat to the particularity of the group (Triandafyllidou, 1998, p. 600). This form of 
competition is usually regarded as contrast or an oppositional relationship and classific­
ation into us / them groups (Woodward, 1997) from which stems the self-definition of a 
group. One knows who one is by knowing who one is not, through an external impulse. 
It is possible that these contrast relationships are absorbed into the traditional myths 
about the origin of the group.
19.2.6 Difference at the personal level: uniqueness -  character
Difference also plays a role at the personal level. Even though individuals are members 
of several groups, according to some theorists they have the task, and according to oth­
ers the need, to distinguish themselves from others. Numerous researchers state with 
greater or lesser clarity that humans have two needs with respect to identity—the need 
to be like others and the need to be unique (Tyler, Kramer & John, 1999, p. 4; c.f. Van 
Baal, 1971, p. 220 on). The need for uniqueness has been more or less equated with 
having an identity tout court (e.g., Klaassen, 1993). In other words, the individual owes 
his particularity to relationships and interaction, and as explained above, to comparison 
with others.
No identity without others it is said, but this statement has various levels of mean­
ing. Others provide a mirror in which the individual can view himself andjudge himself 
as he thinks others do. Cooley’s ‘looking glass self’ (1967) is an aspect of identity in 
which the role of others is expressed in the inner world of the individual. This does not 
mean that others necessarily exercise a form of social control to allow the individual to 
be what he is. Precisely the comparison with others, or rather the difference with others, 
and the apprehension that one is not the other, is a stimulus to the capability of reflexiv- 
ity. In Mead’s terms (1934) it is a typical characteristic of human intelligence that man
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can consider himself as both subject and object. Particularly the latter, self-objectiva­
tion, is important for uniqueness. It means that people take distance from themselves 
and can reflect on themselves and their actions. They can free themselves from the 
stream of impressions and experiences, and regard themselves as an object like other 
objects. In this key they can adopt the perspective of others (role-taking) to understand 
others’ reactions to their behaviour, but the consciousness of not being the same, of not 
coinciding with the other is always present. Precisely by experiencing difference, 
through the resistance that the individual experiences by the reactions of others, self­
consciousness is born. The individual comes to realise that characteristics are unique, 
and that the combination of experiences, reactions, and character, give an authenticity 
that distinguishes a person from others. Character as a personal mode of behaviour and 
as a form of legitimation is the task of every individual, according to Klaassen (1993) 
and Krappmann (1971). In this respect it is important to note that personal characterist­
ics are not a question of choice: one cannot decide to behave in one way one day and in 
another way the following day. One has to be different and to acquire a position in the 
group, and in remaining a good partner in interaction, one must be and remain recognis- 
ably different. That means that one is both the ‘same self’ for oneself, and the ‘same 
other’ for others, and that is then absorbed in the personal identity as character.
19.3 Reconstructed Media Images: Some Characteristics
Research on media portrayals brings us to the conclusion and starting point that media 
images have more the character of a social rather than a personal identity. Frequently 
these studies concern social groups such as children (Alexander, 1994), Arabs (Shaheen, 
1994) or immigrants (Lubbers, Scheepers & Wester, 1998). It is possible that the image 
is that of a person, but in that case it concerns attributed characteristics that are connec­
ted with that individual as example of a certain public category, such as a film star or 
VIP (Deutschman & Ellison, 1999).
When presenting individuals or groups, media texts and pictures use symbols that 
are both an expression of a relationship, as well as the quality of that relationship in the 
form ofjudgments. By using shared, or partially new meanings in representing others or 
groups, media images mediate the collective way of thought that forms the cultural bag­
gage of a community.
In order to gauge the dimensions of media image construction, we will discuss some 
examples from a study of ‘Dutchness’ and ‘Germanness’ in Dutch newspaper reports 
(for a description see Wester, Pleijer & Renckstorf, 2004).
News items of events in various social domains (state visits, football matches, and 
company mergers) with a Dutch-German connection were examined. Image construc­
tion was identified when news items characterised events or the persons concerned in 
terms of their German or Dutch backgrounds.
In case of state visits, the actors are (representatives of) the Dutch and German gov­
ernments. They are presented primarily from the perspective of the political and eco­
nomic relationships between the countries, in relative terms. Germany is thus portrayed 
as powerful and big, and The Netherlands as small and dependent.
The most important actors in the coverage of the merger and dissolution of the Fok- 
ker-Dasa company are the Dutch government, the German concern Dasa and the Dutch 
airplane manufacturer Fokker. The perspective is that of a financial-economic question,
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but images were constructed on the basis of their German or Dutch backgrounds. The 
already mentioned unbalanced relationship (big-small, powerful-dependent) returns 
here.
In the reports of football matches, the chief actors are the German and Dutch nation­
al teams and their strategic, technical and motivational powers, in relative terms. They 
are rivals, sometimes the one team is stronger in one aspect, sometimes the other, but 
the German team is constantly dominating with respect to the mental aspect.
In all three domains, we find an unbalanced relationship (big-small, powerful-de­
pendent), and we also find this to be countered with mentioning Germany’s black past!
When media images emerging from the various cases are compared, it seems, from a 
Dutch perspective, that the relation with Germany may be characterised as a relation­
ship with a big, strong brother with a tainted past. This double significance concerning 
Germany is also found in the view on Germans— a land of culture, a great economic 
power with hard working, thorough people, everything perfectly finished, but arrogant. 
The views on the Dutch are of a trading nation that produces merchants and savers who 
are both patronising and libertines, who always keep bringing up the war (see Wester, 
Pleijter, Renckstorf, 2004).
The question is: are these empirically reconstructed images valid in an analytical 
sense? To what concepts do they refer, or how can they be understood? To answer these 
questions, we must further examine the specific characteristics of Media Images by con­
sidering this type of research outcomes from the analytical perspective of the Dynamic 
Identity Model.
19.4 Analytical Dimensions of the Sensitising Concept Media 
Image
The representation of identity to be worked out here in the Media Image Model follows 
the original Dynamic Identity Model in the sense that media representation is an expres­
sion of relationships, positions, and a self-consciousness that is related to the ‘sender’, 
but the perspective shifts from the individual speaker of the Dynamic Identity Model to 
the media content and the other(s) represented in it.
On the individual level, Pickering (2001) mentions in this respect the ‘exaggeration 
of difference’ that colours the presentation and judgment on the other and at the same 
time has the function of maintaining the superiority, conceit, and high opinion of one’s 
own identity. In short, everyone who says something about the other says something 
about him- or herself and his / her relationship with the other, and what is said about the 
other also concerns one’s own identity. As a consequence the four cells of the Dynamic 
Identity Model are defined from the perspective of the Self.
This is not the case in the Media Image Model, or only in an abstract sense. A l­
though the media are not by definition consonant in their presentation of individuals and 
groups, we still speak of a collective media representation because media are the most 
important mouthpiece for what is going on in a community. When we talk in a general 
sense of the media, we refer to media that function on a societal level, referring to a 
general culture and public opinion as a context. But some media may function on a local 
or regional level, or within a specific group or collectivity as community. In that case, 
the specific group and its worldview are the context for a specific ‘We-perspective’. As
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a consequence, the four cells of the Media Image Model are to be defined from the We- 
perspective of the community implicated as speaker in the media text.
Thus, while in the original Dynamic Identity Model the speaker tells something 
about himself by what he says about others in current times (distinction) or himself in 
the past (continuity), the Media Image Model is primarily directed at the analysis of 
collective representations of others at the present day, formulated in terms of the com­
munity-perspective.
The characteristics of media portrayal noted above make it necessary to extend the 
diagram of the Dynamic Identity Model in section 19.2, to media representations of at­
tributed collective identities (Media Image Model; see Figure 19.2). With this change of 
perspective a number of notable differences emerge. In contrast to the characteristic 
presence of both sameness and difference in the Dynamic Identity Model which endows 
the actor with a dynamic identity, the representation of attributed characteristics is the 
relatively static product of settled cultural experiences and generalisations (stereotypes). 
According to Goffman (1976) advertisements in particular make use of simplified 
highly ritualised meanings that are immediately obvious. In this way media content 
manifests the settled collective thought and definition processes as attributed character­
istics and judgments on persons and members of groups or collectivities. Typical is that 
these are to be found in a continuum stretching between idealisation and stigmatisation: 
in media images sameness and difference tend to be both exaggerated. This perspective 
connects us to both the ritualisation of meaning noted by Goffman (ibid.), a condensa­
tion and simplification of meaning that makes media portrayal easily accessible to a 
large group of community members. But at the same time it connects us with the char­
acter of stereotypes noted by Pickering (2001) in connection with national identity, the 
subject of the examples in section 19.3.
The representation of the other may concern a single person or, more usually, social 
groups or categories within the community to which the speaking WE belong, or it also 
may concern representatives of another community. In the latter case the portrayal of a 
foreign national identity clearly concerns a collective identity that is compared with the 
collective identity of the WE-community.
To define the dimensions relevant for the study of media images, we first concen­
trate on the general model of representation of groups or categories, like youngsters,
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Figure 19.2 From Dynamic Identity Model to Media Image Model
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women, far right or psychiatrists. These representations portray partial identities within 
the community defined from the WE-perspective.
As we have seen in section 19.2, sameness is inwardly directed, reflexive, its tem­
poral orientation is on the past and also contains an affective component that refers to 
involvement and loyalty. If we translate this into the Media Image Model, sameness is 
used to define the collectivity’s place in the community’s history. It refers to its nature 
and origin as defined through the WE-perspective and the affective relationship the 
community maintains with the group. Dependent on its specific role in the community’s 
history, it concerns a characterisation as alien or common in terms of the WE-perspect- 
ive. This often means that an implied comparison group (women -  men, immigrants -  
nationals) is used to produce a balance or counterpart.
With respect to difference it is clear that its temporal orientation is focused on the 
‘now’ and the current experiences of the community. The identity thus represented im­
plies a relative positioning of the comparison parties involved with respect to each other 
based upon attributed characteristics and judgments, either positive or negative. Ulti­
mately it comes to distance, elaborated in terms of a relative balance of positive and 
negative characteristics.
Representation of another identity at the collective level follows an exaggerated ‘lo­
gic of difference’, as described in section 19.2, rather than following the ‘rules’ of 
everyday life. The process in the background is known as drawing symbolic limits—and 
in fact creating emotional distance. The greater the emotional distance, the more charac­
teristics that indicate danger, menace, or distrust are deployed. In other words: the rep­
resented category is symbolically and emotionally exiled. Complementary to this it 
follows that the less the emotional distance, the greater the emphasis on similarity and 
membership.
But, as said, the model also offers the possibility to portray individuals as represent­
ative of a group, category or community. In that case it is not the personal identity that 
is represented but his or her public identity. Individuals are thus not private persons but 
well-known characters of collective importance who are regarded as public property. 
Whenever individuals are placed in the spotlight they become exemplary cases who 
played a special role in a collective past (e.g., a naval hero such as De Ruyter, a painter 
such as Rembrandt) or in the present when their unique gift or talent distinguishes them 
from the general mass, such as sports(wo)men or artists. In the Media Image Model 
sameness refers to values of the community that are mirrored in the narrative of the her­
o’s life. We learned from the discussion in section 19.2 that a single partial identity 
dominates the image—the naval hero, the sporting hero, or the Nobel Prize winner who 
represents all that is best,just as the traitor or rapist represents the very worst.
In the Media Image Model, difference in regard to others emerges by defining the 
person as exceptional. The portrayed person is different from the others, whether in a 
positive sense by talent, charisma, or promise or in a negative sense through madness, 
hysteria or some other deficiency.
National identity is expressed on a personal level by national heroes. The same se­
lective view occurs at a collective level, but then with special events that are seen as 
characteristic for a collective past. This concerns collective memory, partly maintained 
by the teaching of history and remembrance rituals that express relationship and con­
nection, and tales of events that express success and satisfaction (for the Dutch: East In­
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dies Company / VOC mentality, 1988) or trauma and shame (Dutch: WWII, 
Srebrenica).
But in all these cases the WE-perspective is self-centered. In the representation of a 
strange national identity in community media the aforementioned processes of sameness 
and difference with respect to collectivities are used, but now with the own community 
as a comparison group. Sameness refers to the role of the other nation in the com­
munity’s history, and the affective relationship the community feels. Difference refers to 
current experiences of the community with that other nation. The double significance 
that emerged in section 19.3— Germany as the big strong brother with the tainted past— 
is now more easily understandable as a one-sided Dutch perspective. The brother indic­
ates familiarity, which creates a relative ordering: big and strong point to the acknow­
ledgement of a hierarchical difference, for instance the economic dependence of the 
Netherlands on its neighbour. The tainted past indicates a stigma, but also a moral re­
sponsibility due to a common past. That past plays a considerable role because it is 
linked to a collective trauma that is kept alive through remembrance rituals. It is hardly 
imaginable that the German perspective on itself or on the Netherlands will use the 
same lines of thought, or use the same imagery.
19.5 Conclusion
In summary, in this chapter we have illustrated that media portrayals of groups and so­
cial categories share the basic structures of social identity construction of persons and 
groups interacting and living together.
Media representations are cultural vehicles, containing both shared and contested 
meanings that witness the dynamics of historical self-understanding of a community. In 
expanding the conceptual elaboration of the dynamic construction of personal and social 
identity (Dynamic Identity Model) with a focus on media portrayal, we have sensitised 
that the main characteristics of the Media Image Model can be seen as a negative of the 
Dynamic Identity Model. The community perspective uses the personal levels as exem­
plary cases of its values. The exaggeration of sameness and difference is its main rhetor­
ical device (Media Image Model). Media imagery is thus moving somewhere between 
the polarities of idealisation and stigmatisation, to enhance collective accessibility by 
deploying stereotypes and categorisations.
We have also discussed the major role of history, both in the processes of identity 
construction and representation, as well as the emotional quality of the relationship that 
underlies identification and representation. Emotional distance and involvement is in 
fact intertwined with the memory of events relevant for the community and its relation­
ship with other groups, categories or communities. This mostly latent role of the com­
munity perspective accounts for the complexity of the phenomena of identity 
construction and representation in media imagery.
This complexity necessitates researchers in the field of mediated social representa­
tions to take these characteristics into account in order to reach a deeper understanding 
of the nature and tenacity of social categorisations. In conclusion we may define four 
principles for the study of media images. First of all, the analyst has to define the com­
munity perspective contained in the media text. Next, both sameness and difference 
must be used as dimensions for the articulation of characteristics of the portrayed social 
category or group. These articulations then, refer to community values as highlighted in
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the community’s past or excellent community representatives. These articulations tend, 
lastly, to be stereotyped by comparing groups as counterparts, which as a consequence, 
defines their relative distance from the cultural core.
The same principles hold for images referring to national identities. This is espe­
cially relevant in situations where a text seems to focus only on characterisations of the 
other nation. On a more latent, underlying level, the narratives of past experiences and 
present interactions of the home nation, implicated in the media text, form the context 
that defines these typifications. As a consequence, comparative research of media im­
ages in media texts from different countries needs a design that does justice to each dif­
ferent cultural-historical context as a means to understand the intricacies of media 
images.
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